By: Aditi
Published on: Mar 29, 2025
As geopolitical tensions rise and the United States' commitment to European security becomes uncertain, NATO members like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are ramping up defence spending. However, the economic and credit implications of these rearmament plans vary significantly due to differing fiscal policies, debt levels, and political constraints.
This article explores how Germany’s debt-funded approach contrasts with France and the UK’s more constrained fiscal strategies, analyzing the potential impacts on public debt, economic growth, and credit ratings.
Germany, with its strong fiscal position, is uniquely positioned to increase defence spending without major budgetary trade-offs. The country’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 63% (2024) and a modest budget deficit of 2.0% allow significant borrowing capacity.
Key factors driving Germany’s approach:
Two-thirds parliamentary majority secured to reform the constitutional debt brake, enabling higher debt issuance.
No need for major tax hikes or spending cuts in other sectors.
Defence spending could rise to €140+ billion annually (3% of GDP by 2027).
Germany’s fiscal stimulus could boost economic growth across Europe, benefiting defence manufacturers in France and the UK. However, supply chain bottlenecks and reliance on US arms imports may limit regional benefits.
France faces tighter fiscal constraints, with:
Government debt at 113% of GDP (2024).
Budget deficit of 5.8% of GDP, limiting new borrowing.
Minority government and fragmented parliament, making spending reforms difficult.
To meet NATO’s potential 3% of GDP defence target, France must:
Increase defence spending by €30 billion annually (0.9% of GDP).
Likely cut social welfare (3% of current allocations) or raise taxes.
Risk higher bond yields, worsening debt sustainability.
If France relies on borrowing, public debt could reach 120% of GDP by 2027, up 21 percentage points from pre-pandemic levels.
The UK’s fiscal position is less flexible than Germany’s but better than France’s:
Debt-to-GDP at 100% (2024).
Deficit of 5.8% of GDP, similar to France.
Parliamentary majority allows easier spending reforms.
To reach 3% of GDP defence spending (€95 billion/year), the UK may:
Issue new debt (€20 billion/year, 0.7% of GDP).
Cut non-defence expenditures, such as infrastructure or welfare.
Net interest payments could exceed 7% of revenue, straining budgets.
UK debt may rise to 109% of GDP by 2027, up 23 percentage points from pre-Covid levels.
| Country | 2024 Debt (% GDP) | 2027 Projection (% GDP) | Change (pp) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | 63% | 69% | +6 |
| UK | 100% | 109% | +9 |
| France | 113% | 120% | +7 |
France & UK: Higher bond yields may increase borrowing costs, worsening debt dynamics.
Germany: Large fiscal stimulus could overheat inflation, complicating ECB policy.
Supply chain bottlenecks may delay defence production, reducing economic spillovers.
Germany (Stable): Strong fiscal buffers mitigate risks.
France (Negative Pressure): High debt and political instability raise downgrade risks.
UK (Neutral to Negative): Debt sustainability concerns persist.
The divergent approaches of Germany, France, and the UK highlight how national fiscal policies will determine the economic impact of rearmament:
Germany’s debt-funded model is sustainable but may fuel inflation.
France’s high debt limits flexibility, requiring painful trade-offs.
The UK’s balanced approach may stabilize debt but at the cost of growth.
As Europe strengthens its defences, investors and policymakers must monitor debt sustainability, bond market reactions, and growth spillovers to assess long-term credit risks.
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